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Abstract
Using results from neurobiology on perceptual decision making and
value-based decision making, the problem of decision making between
lotteries is reformulated in an abstract space where uncertain prospects
are mapped to corresponding active neuronal representations. This
mapping allows us to maximize non-extensive entropy in the new space
with some constraints instead of a utility function. To achieve good
agreements with behavioral data, the constraints must include at least
constraints on the weighted average of the stimulus and on its vari-
ance. Both constraints are supported by the adaptability of neuronal
responses to an external stimulus. By analogy with thermodynamic
and information engines, we discuss the dynamics of choice between
two lotteries as they are being processed simultaneously in the brain
by rate equations that describe the transfer of attention between lot-
teries and within the various prospects of each lottery. This model is
able to give new insights on risk aversion and on behavioral anomalies
not accounted for by Prospect Theory.
Keywords: Allais paradox, stochastic dominance, Maxwell’s demon,
nonextensive entropy, variance, neurobiology, Birnbaum paradoxes.
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1 Introduction
The underlying neuronal mechanisms of decision-making in the brain are sill
largely unknown, especially in complex tasks where uncertainty in the choices is
important in the decision process. However, at the behavioral level, risky decision-
making models are numerous and vary in methods of treatment with little attention
to the neuronal basis of the process. This work is an attempt to build a model of
risky decision-making based on behavioral results that also accounts for some of the
features we learned about the brain network during decision tasks.
The Allais paradox [3] has been a driving force behind the development of utility-
based theories for the last seventy years or so. The paradox was a concrete example
that human behavior is incompatible with Expected Utility Theory (EUT) of von
Neumann and Morgenstern [120]. In spite of its simplicity, EUT has a concave utility
function that successfully accounts for subjective values of goods and is consistent
with the law of diminishing marginal utility as opposed to the naive linear expected
value theory (EVT). To study uncertainties in economic decisions, lotteries became
a simple testing ground for theories of choice. In EUT, the prospect of a lottery
is weighted by a linear probability which in a choice task between lotteries leads to
common outcomes being ignored. This property is called independence of outcomes.
The Allais paradox showed that the independence property of EUT is violated by
most people.
Among the many extensions of EUT, Prospect Theory (PT), which is also an
expectation-based model similar to EUT [51, 114], is by far the most popular theory of
decision making under risk. PT extended EUT by introducing subjective probabilities
and accounting for loss aversion. The subjective probabilities are nonlinear functions
of the probabilities of the prospects that give rise to inverse-S shapes to reflect non-
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linear behavior near small or large probabilities of outcomes. In PT, the decision
maker (DM) is assumed to choose the lottery with the maximum utility [31].
Allais, in his 1953 paper, already suggested that linear probabilities in EUT may
have to be modified along with including variance of the distribution of outcomes as
an explicit parameter in the utility function. Rank-dependent utility theories, which
cumulative Prospect Theory is an example, appear to show dependence on variance,
but only indirectly through nonlinearities in the weights of prospects. While utility-
based models of decision making are widely adopted, there are also other models that
do not require a utility function. These models are called heuristic models and are
only based on a set of simple rules [36, 38] that follow the "good enough" principle to
make a decision [106, 103]. Simon [107] proposed in the 1950s that bounded rational
decision makers do not commit to an unlimited optimization by searching for the
absolute best option. Rather, they follow a strategy of satisficing, i.e. they settle
for an option that is good enough in some sense. These heuristic models are not
well developed analytically, but may prove to be better suited models in situations
where the number of options is large or the probabilities of outcomes are unknown
[36]. These heuristic models were motivated by physiological considerations such as
the limited cognitive capacity of a decision maker to make the best decision in each
choice task. Therefore, the principle of optimizing a utility function is not always the
best way to make a decision in the face of uncertainty and risk [74]. In this paper,
we adopt an approach that is both physically motivated and quantitative. It takes
into account the physicality of the decision maker (DM) and that his or her organism
obeys the law of maximum entropy with some constraints [48]. The optimization of
entropy instead of utility has been previously suggested by Candeal et al. [22]. Their
proposal was based on the similarities of the mathematical properties of utility and
entropy if a ’preference’ relation is defined on the state space according to possible
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transitions between the states or prospects.
Allais considered lotteries with higher variance, but same mean, to be riskier.
The direct association of variance with risk is a familiar concept in the modern portfo-
lio theory in finance where the efficient frontier of the portfolio is chosen by minimizing
its variance [67]. But, rank-dependent utility-based theories do not take variance as
an explicit parameter in the theory. One of the main reasons behind this neglect
is that within PT, variance is minimized in risk averse situations such as the case
when dealing with lotteries with positive outcomes; but variance is maximized in
risk seeking situations such as the case of lotteries with negative outcomes. If a
lottery with outcomes x1, x2, ..., xn and corresponding probabilities p1, p2, ..., pn are
represented by (x1, p1; x2, p2; ...., xn, pn), then given two lotteries A+ = ($100, 1), and
B+ = ($500, 0.2; $0, 0.8), people tend to prefer lottery A+ rather than lottery B+
where lottery A+ has zero variance. However, when it comes to choosing between
lotteries A− = (−$100, 1) and B− = (−$500, 0.2; $0, 0.8), people tend to choose B−
which has a larger variance. This asymmetry between positive and negative out-
comes, called the reflection effect in PT, was not exactly what Allais had anticipated
in his original work. Because PT can explain this behavior of people avoiding sure
loss, variance has not been explicitly incorporated in utility theories.
One of the main objectives of this paper is to include the variance of the dis-
tribution of outcomes explicitly in the analysis of risky decision making. Presently,
computational models of decision making include some kind of variance in the anal-
ysis. This variance is modeled as some additive noise that is added to each outcome.
The noise is independently distributed across outcomes, and its strength is assigned
ad-hoc. Theories that fall in this latter category include Stochastic Expected Utility,
e.g, Blavatskyy [16], and drift-diffusion-based models [91, 50, 19, 94].
The first attempt to use entropy as a measure of spread of outcomes in a lot-
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tery was by Meginniss [70]. He proposed the following extension to utility theory
for a gamble (x1, p1;x2, p2; ..., xn, pn) with utilities u(xi), i = 1, 2, ..., n and entropy
H(p1, p2, ..., pn) [105]
U(x, p) =
n∑
i=1
piu(xi) + βH(p1, p2, ..., pn), (1)
where β is a free parameter that can be either positive or negative. Luce et al. [65]
and by Ng, Luce and Marley [75] developed this idea further axiomatically. Instead
in this paper, our goal is to develop Meginnis’ idea in a more physical way.
In his thesis, Meginnis showed that his proposed utility function satisfies tran-
sitivity, irrelevance of impossible outcomes, and more importantly, that lotteries with
equal probability weights are preferred to lotteries with different probability weights
when prospects are the same. The extra entropy term allowed him to predict that
risk-taking behavior should be observable in situations that involve large gains but
small probabilities or a small loss with a large probability as is the case when buying
a lottery ticket. Similarly, risk-taking behavior can be observed in events with small
gains and large probabilities or large losses with small probabilities as in the case of
crossing the street to get a coffee. Another advantage of including an entropic term
in the utility function is that he was able to show that buying insurance and gam-
bling behavior are both still explainable with a monotonic concave wealth function
as opposed to the idea that concavity is not a valid requirement in this situation [32].
To explain the Allais paradox, Meginnis needed a negative scaling parameter β
in Eq. 1. This signals that in the Allais lottery, the DM is entropy averse. A negative
β was also needed to get a similar efficient frontier as in the modern portfolio theory
of Markowitz [67]. In this paper, the parameter β is fixed by the distribution of
prospects independent of other lotteries. However, this is achieved only if variance of
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the distribution of outcomes is also included as an additional term in the utility. In
the theory presented here, the explicit inclusion of variance amounts to controlling the
convexity of the decision maker’s utility function. Experimental behavioral economics
and neuroscience data support the idea that a DM is sensitive to variations in variance
of choices. For example, in the ultimatum game, it was demonstrated by Vavra, Chang
and Sanfey [118] that both the mean and variance of offers from the proposer have
direct and different bearings on the response of the receiver. A smaller variance makes
the receiver less accepting of "unfair" proposals, while a larger variance showed a more
relaxed pattern of accepting or rejecting offers which can be interpreted as a noisier
response than in the low variance case. Sensitivity to variance has been also observed
by neuroimaging techniques. Kobayashi, de Carvalho and Schultz [56] measured
different responses in orbitofrontal neurons in animals to two distributions of juice
volumes with the same mean but different variance. When processing various images,
retinal cells were also shown to adapt to variance in a stimulus to efficiently process
a wide range of light intensities [108]. Variance can also have a discounting effect on
rewards. In a rapid serial visual presentation paradigm, Apps et al. [4] showed that
participants were affected by both the amount of cognitive effort exerted in a task,
which is measured by the number of shifts of spatial attention, and to the variance
in the possible amount of cognitive effort that need to be exerted. Both factors were
found to be independent. This shows that variance can act as a cost function in a
benefit-cost type of analysis and can affect decision making independently of other
factors.
In spite of the successes of PT, decision making models in risky situations still
remain a work in progress. An extensive replication study of the behavioral phenom-
ena that supported PT was recently conducted by Millroth, Nilsson and Juslin [73]
with a broad spectrum from the population as opposed to using only students. They
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found that the replication of the new predicted behaviors by PT was poor. From the
nine paradoxes that PT explained, more than 50 % of the participants exhibited at
most three of the nine paradoxes studied by Kahneman and Tversky [51]. Similarly,
the functional form of PT is not unique. Stott [109], who extensively studied the pos-
sible different forms of PT in the literature, concluded that the weighting function of
subjective probabilities is best described by Prelec’s exponential-log form [89] rather
than the initial algebraic form suggested by Kahneman and Tversky. In general, PT
requires three parameters to capture the distortion of probabilities, the curvature of
the value function, and loss aversion. In addition to these parameters, there are some
editing rules like fusing or coalescing branches with similar outcomes that need to be
applied to the gamble before fitting it to the PT model. PT itself has two versions,
one that violates stochastic dominance and another that does not. Stochastic dom-
inance is a fairly standard property of preference relations obeyed a ‘rational’ DM
which basically expresses that more is better, but this property requires the cumu-
lative probability distribution function of outcomes to express it mathematically, a
non-trivial matter to carry out consciously by a DM. In fact, it is now believed that
stochastic dominance can be violated by a DM and that this violation is genuine and
not due to framing effects [64, 9, 27]. Attempts to provide a decision theory that
accounts for violations of stochastic dominance have already appeared in the litera-
ture [9, 27, 49]. In this paper, we will also provide a theory that allows for stochastic
dominance violations, but the motivations for this violation are different. They are
mainly an interplay between averseness to entropy and risk.
In addition to violations of stochastic dominance, PT was also found to violate
preference behavior in situations where lottery branches are coalesced or split in a
particular way irrespective of framing effects [13, 12, 14, 8, 9, 10, 11]. To address
these new paradoxes, Birnbaum proposed a new descriptive theory, the transfer of
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attention exchange model (TAX), that accounts for old and new violations. While
TAX did not model attention in any physical way, we will provide in this paper
an explicit model of attention guided by working memory (WM) and based on a
Markovian process. The memory part of the model plays the role of bookkeeping for
the mental state similar to the role played by a Maxwell demon [69]. In 1929, Szilard
[110] provided the first example of a Maxwell demon that integrated physical entropy
with information entropy by making the memory of the demon part of the physical
system. In short, the Maxwell demon plays the role of a ’traffic controller’ that uses
gained information to extract work from the system [85]. By analogy, the demon
or WM interacts with lotteries to gain information that can be used to maximize
anticipated utility. Thus our intent is to develop ideas that can be extended to deal
with real ensemble of neurons starting from behavioral data. This is the reason behind
insisting on a formulation that respects physical laws. However, this requires a new
reinterpretation of the gamble in terms of biological inputs which necessarily includes
an energy component in addition to an entropic contribution.
Since the human brain is a physical system, it must also satisfy established
physical laws, such as that of maximizing entropy, while processing information to
produce a decision. It is important to keep in mind that a decision is a process that is
inherently irreversible and involves global changes in the mental state. According to
neuroimaging studies using fMRI, the brain is modular which implies that decisions
are most probably made within a specific set of neurons and then the outcome of the
decision is propagated to other areas of the brain responsible for action. It has been
so far difficult to pinpoint a specific set of neurons that are always responsible for
decision making, but what is known so far is that areas in the cortex such as vmPFC,
posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), striatum are involved in economic decision making
[23, 26]. Other areas that partake in the decision may include LIP [95], dorsolateral
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PFC [100], and basal ganglia [17]. The take-away point from these studies is that the
instant the decision is made, it is locally executed in the brain. Hence during that
window of time, the subset of neurons that are directly involved in the transition from
a multi-option state to a single state can be considered to be strongly interacting in the
presence of a background of other neurons from other areas of the brain. For example,
in economic decision problems, the work of Padoa-Schioppa [83] points to the OFC
region of the cortex as the most probable region where the decision is being executed.
The local character of computations in the brain is supported by the organization of
the neural network itself. Compared to the available local connections, there are only
sparse long-range connectivity in the cortex. It is believed that this structure may be
advantageous to have an efficient computation system where intensive calculations,
like a decision, are carried locally and only the result is transmitted to other areas of
the brain [59]. This will be an important assumption in our model that we will use
to motivate our entropic formulation of the decision process.
Pictorially, the neurons that are encoding two prospects are represented by the
neural network blocks in Fig. 1 for a two-choice task. Right before the decision phase,
each group of neurons representing a prospect can be considered in a metastable state
since the neurons in that set are mostly strongly interacting with each other and with
relatively weaker interaction with the rest of the neurons in the brain. Given that
each neuron interacts approximately with about 10, 000 other neurons, the neurons
representing prospects 1 and 2 can be considered in a quasi-equilibrium state inde-
pendent of those representing the other prospect(s). Since we are mainly interested in
value-based decision making behavior, we will assume that value is expressed in terms
of the intensity of firings or interactions in the neurons that are encoding a prospect.
This is a generally valid assumption used in popular models of neuronal dynamics. In
Wang’s model of motion perception of parietal neurons, higher firing rate corresponds
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Figure 1 . Neural representation of a two-choice task. Each choice is initially repre-
sented by a group of neurons independently of the others. During the decision phase,
both sets of neurons become coupled. Both sets of neurons directly involved in the
decision state reside in the cortex.
to higher value [121, 124, 122]. In the Good-based model of [80], higher firing rates
are also correlated with higher values. The neuronal representation of the prospects
that we adopt in this paper were motivated by measurements of Padoa-Schioppa’s
group [81, 84, 82].
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Finally, we need to point out one important discrepancy that exists between mi-
croscopic (neuronal-based) and macroscopic (behavioral-based) models in perceptual
decision making. According to the microscopic treatments, winner-take-all network
models best describe the decision process in which the two choices are represented in
the firing rates of separate populations of neurons. The populations compete through
interneuron-mediated inhibition leading to a winner-take-all behavior [121]. On the
other hand, most currently popular macroscopic models rely on an accumulating ev-
idence procedure to reach a threshold upon which a decision is made [94, 115, 112].
There is still no consensus if the mechanism for perceptual decision is the same for
value-based decisions [40]. We will assume that value-based decisions and perceptual
decisions share similar dynamic features in brain regions where the neuron popula-
tions of discarded prospects occur.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We first introduce a simple exper-
iment of two gambles that have close to extreme probabilities and equal expectation
values. Our measurements give results that are in direct opposition to Prospect The-
ory and the TAX model. By treating the decision problem as a signal processing
problem, we show that our simple model gives the measured results. Our model also
does not distort probabilities or utilities but assumes fluctuations in the number of
spikes in the population of neurons encoding the prospects, i.e. noisy probabilities,
and maximizes the Shannon entropy of the gamble. This method has no free param-
eters and has parallels with signal detection theory [126]. Next, we extend Meginnis’
method by using non-extensive entropy and adding variance explicitly to the ’utility’
function. We apply this new model to the equal expected value lotteries example.
This model has only a single parameter that is interpreted as due to the interaction
of two choices in the brain of a DM. The model is able to explain the new anomalies
discovered by Birnbaum [9]. To account for some of the dynamical features of a de-
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cision task in the brain, a theory of Attention is proposed. This extended model is
constructed by analogy with the Maxwell demon in information engines. It models
bias and (implicit) attention switching rates between all prospects of both lotteries
in a two-choice task. The model allows us to estimate the percentage of population
choosing one lottery and not the other. All three approaches that we discuss are
complementary and should be part of a comprehensive theory of decision making. In
the final section, we summarize our results and briefly discuss extensions of the ideas
presented in this work.
2 Decision Making as a Signal Processing Task: The case of equal
expected values
One important finding in neuroeconomics is that subjective values are repre-
sented explicitly at the neuronal level [37]. In a decision making task, different cells
encode different variables. Padoa-Schioppa [80] reported that the cells that encode
values and choices are found to be in the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) region of the
brain. However, background noise in the OFC is significant and may lead to fluctua-
tions in the encoded variables such as the probabilities of the lotteries. In this section,
we will consider only this effect in a very simplified model of neuronal excitations.
The case of equal expected values and equal entropies provide a stringent test of
the ideas proposed by Meginnis [70]. To be concrete let’s consider the following case
inspired by studies from the work of Lichenstein and Slovic [63] on bets with high prob-
ability values and low utility values of outcomes and vice-versa. As an example, let’s
consider the following gambles A = ($10, 0.90; $0, 0.10) and B = ($90, 0.10; $0, 0.90).
Here, we have EV (A) = EV (B) = $9, where EV stands for expected value, and
H(A) = H(B) = 0.325. Using u(xi) = xi in Eq. 1, we have the utility of both
gambles U = 9 + 0.325β . Therefore, in this case there is no β that can give a pref-
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erence order between both gambles. However, the majority of people prefer gamble
A to gamble B. Cumulative Prospect Theory [114] is also of no help in this pair of
gambles unless the probability weight function is allowed to be ’S’ shaped, i.e., γ > 1,
which is not supported by measurement. Using their value γ = 0.61 for their original
probability weight functions [114], we find that U(A) = $7.12 and U(B) = $16.77.
Therefore, according to PT, B is preferred to A. For the TAX model of Birnbaum
[9], we find that U(A) = $5.49 and U(B) = $10.6. Therefore, similar to PT, the TAX
model predicts that people should choose B over A 1.
To get around these difficulties, we instead adopt a more microscopic
(biophysically-inspired) picture of the process of decision making. As we noted in
the previous section, probabilities are positively correlated with firing rates between
neurons. In a simple perceptual decision task that consists of identifying the direction
of motion of a dot on a screen, neurons in the middle temporal (MT) of the brain,
which are sensitive only to motion directions, start firing with higher frequency con-
sistent with the behavioral response. Moreover, fluctuations in the firings are also
reflected in fluctuations in the decisions [18, 76]. Adopting this picture, we can easily
see that because of the noisy environment in the brain, there will be a distribution
of firing rates representing the probability distribution of outcomes themselves. In
other words, the probabilities of outcomes represent only an average of a distribution
with some variance. These fluctuations in the probabilities may become important
in a pair of gambles like the one we are considering. Of course, we may expect also
fluctuations in the representations of the values of the outcomes too. But for the
moment, we will confine ourselves to try to account for the fluctuations around the
probability values. In principle, a microscopic treatment should be able to provide a
1These numbers for the TAX model were calculated using the online calculator available at
Birnbaum’s site: http://psych.fullerton.edu/mbirnbaum/calculators/taxcalculator.htm
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probability distribution of outcomes and any fuzziness around those values.
In this paper, we are going to focus our attention on the state of neurons after the
encoding phase of the stimulus and right before the actual physical decision is carried
out on the neuronal level, i.e., when the various neuronal assemblies representing
the various options are transformed to a single assembly representing the chosen
outcome. To keep a faithful representation of the decision task, the neuronal cells
must maintain a stable firing rate for each outcome. In this example, the gamble
has two outcomes which will be represented by two neuronal populations, eg., in
the OFC region [82]. It is believed that it is this phase of the decision process
that is the most energy-intensive and that the magnitude of neuroimaging signals
reflects this processing, while neurons in the post-decision phase appear to be less
active [43]. This is also supported by observations made on neuronal activities in
monkeys after the external cues have disappeared from the view [28]. Given the large
number of neurons in the frontal area of the cortex, about 10 billion [87], and a large
number of synapses per neuron, this state, just before the decision, can last several
hundred milliseconds and stay coherent [35] during that time. This implies some
sort of a metastable state is established before a signal from neurons carrying the
output is registered. While we will be interested in this particular state, the details
of how the output comes about is outside the scope of this paper. However, the
scenario we adopt here is more in line with a winner-take-all paradigm rather than
an accumulation one, and the spikes are assumed to maximally distribute themselves
among the different option states of the gamble. Presently, diffusion models, which
are based on evidence accumulation, are more popular because of their flexibility to
model many perceptual decision behaviors [92, 94, 116], but there are other models
that do not rely on this scheme that evidence is being accumulated until a threshold
is reached [17, 41, 104, 21, 20]. It is also important to remember that the diffusion
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picture is not supported by what happens at the neuronal dynamic level [97] which
at best, under crude assumptions, can be reduced to a nonlinear diffusion equation
in the case of a two-choice decision. Therefore, our broad assumptions are justified
since they don’t put severe constraints on the actual dynamics of neuronal spiking.
Next we discuss one last ingredient in the proposed model, i.e., energy. Many
studies in the literature consider decision making as information processing in the
brain. Therefore, the goal in those studies is to find an efficient mechanism to carry
out this process. However, information processing cannot be disentangled from the
process of energy consumption. The brain consumes almost 20% of metabolic energy
per weight continuously [46]. Moreover, information processing is costly. It takes
about 104 ATP molecules to transmit a bit at a chemical synapse and 106− 107 ATP
molecules for graded signals in an interneuron, photoreceptor, or for spike coding
[60]. In a study on photoreceptors in flies, it was observed that higher light intensi-
ties require much more energy to process. Therefore, energy considerations can lead
to stricter constraints than those due to information processing [77]. Other studies
also showed that taking into account energy considerations in addition to neural cod-
ing efficiency changes the understanding of what is being optimized. Consideration
based solely on information theory tend to have a goal of minimizing entropy [53, 6].
However, when energy considerations are included, efficient information processing,
i.e., firing rates, can sometimes favor increases in entropy [62]. According to Padoa-
Schioppa [80], each neuronal response encoded only one variable, and the encoding
was linear. Therefore, higher outcome values translate into higher firing rates which
implies higher energy consumption. In other words, the higher the utility function,
the higher the energy needed to represent that utility in the brain. This is how en-
ergy is introduced in our model which may translate into maximizing motivational
states or anticipating states rather than gains. Therefore, an outcome in a gamble
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will be considered as an abstract energy state among other available energy states
representing other outcomes. Neurons themselves are not important in this picture;
only the different populations of spikes and their number is what interest us here.
Throughout the lifetime of the metastable state before the decision, spikes are cre-
ated and destroyed through feedback loops, but the average number of spikes at any
instant2 in time is assumed to be on average constant in each population. If we treat
each gamble separately, it is abstractly represented by a system of ‘energy levels’ that
represent value ‘populated’ by corresponding spikes with their corresponding relative
number representing probabilities. Taking this point of view, our decision problem
becomes an inverse problem of a familiar problem in statistical physics that of de-
termining the distribution of particles among n energy levels in contact with a heat
bath at given temperature [47]. In our case, we have a distribution of spikes over n
outcomes, and we want to determine external parameters due to other neurons in the
background that help in maintaining the metastable state of the neurons directly in-
volved in the decision phase. This model is similar in spirit to the Good-based model
of Padoa-Schioppa [80] and Padoa-Schioppa [83] in that the states of the decision
space are labeled by the outcome values. This model, as it stands, is incapable of
leading us dynamically to the post decision state, since the interneurons in the OFC
that encode the chosen value are not part of the model [98]. But in the presence of
another gamble, we will assume that the gamble that is less noisy will be the one that
will be transformed to a chosen state given that the average strength of both signals
(i.e., gambles) are the same. This is what we will show next.
In Fig. 2, a pictorial representation of the abstract space of stimulus represen-
tation by neurons in the cortex is shown. Given that all the spikes are similar, the
2The term ‘instant’ here means a time interval that is very short with respect to the time scale
of the decision which is of the order of 100 msec.
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overall state of the gamble is therefore symmetric with respect to an exchange of two
spikes irrespective if they encode outcome 1 or outcome 2. We will assume in the
following that outcome x2 > x1. Therefore, the metastable state is characterized by
two parameters, the average energy, u¯ = p1x1 + p2x2 (i.e., utility) and the average
number of total spikes ns = n1 + n2. The averages are defined with respect to the
exponential (Boltzmann) distributions that maximize the Shannon entropy and are
given by Huang [47]:
p(xi) =
1/ns
λexj/β − 1 (2)
Since the average pi = ni/ns, then any noisy encoding of the stimulus will lead to
noisy encoding of the anticipated utility, ∆u2 = u2 − u¯2. The signal to noise ratio,
SNR, for this gamble is therefore equal to, SNR = u¯/
(
∆u2
)1/2
, or
SNR = p1x1 + p2x2
|β|
[
(p21 + p22) lnλ2 + 2
(
1
ns
)2]1/2 (3)
where
β = nsp1p2
p1 − p2 (x2 − x1) , (4)
ln λ2 =
(
x1
β
− 1
n1
)2
. (5)
It should be noted that the SNR is zero when p1 = p2 = 0.5, which is what we expect
if only spikes determine the outcome as assumed here.
For our particular gambles, we have for gamble A, x1 = 0, x2 = $10, p1 = 0.10
and p2 = 0.90, which amounts to SNR(A) = 0.873. For gamble B, we have x1 =
0, x2 = $90, p1 = 0.90 p2 = 0.10. In this case, SNR(B) = 0.512, which is less than the
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Figure 2 . A schematic representation of the metastable state of the neurons repre-
senting the stimulus in the decision phase and right before the ’birth’ of the chosen
state. The spikes 1 and 2 are only differentiated by their frequency and the popula-
tion of neurons that form the background for these spikes. These neurons themselves
are in contact with another large number of neurons that may be part of the cortex
or subcortex, such as the amygdala, that are considered part of the ambient medium
or bath.
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signal-to-noise ratio of gamble (stimulus) A. Hence, treating choice between gambles
A and B as an information processing problem, it is more efficient to process A,
the gamble with lower variance, than gamble B. This result agrees with what most
people choose, and it does not agree with the predictions of PT and the TAX models.
Therefore, for equal utilities, it is shown here that variance in outcomes becomes the
decisive factor in the decision making process. Interestingly, the same conclusion has
been reached in a perception experiment using the more elaborate theory of Friston’s
minimization of surprise [102]. Hence, we turn next to formulating our choice problem
in terms of maximization of entropy with constraints that include variance of outcomes
explicitly.
3 Decision Making from Non-extensive Entropy Maximization
The discussion in the previous section was based on adopting a simple repre-
sentation of the underlying environment of the spikes that encoded the stimulus. To
address more complicated situations, we will instead apply Jaynes’ principle of max-
imum entropy [48] to the macroscopic states but include risk or variance of outcomes
explicitly as suggested by Allais [3]. Moreover, we will use a generalized form of
entropy, non-extensive entropy, to describe the mental states of a DM.
Meginniss [70], in the Appendix of his thesis, pointed to the possibility of using
non-extensive entropy instead of Shannon entropy. Non-extensive entropy was first
suggested by Havrda and Charvat [44] based solely on mathematical properties of
entropy when the additive property is no longer valid. The first serious applications
of non-extensive entropy appeared in physics [113] and later by Ng, Luce and Marley
[75] to decision making. Here, we will follow our treatment in the previous section, but
start directly from maximizing the non-extensive entropy under constraints of both
average outcome and variance of the gamble. These constraints can be understood in
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terms of the adaptability of neurons to stimuli intensity and number of outcomes. The
idea of maximizing entropy, adopted here for value-based decisions under uncertainty,
is similar to the one used by Schwatenbeck et al. [102] in the analysis of a perceptual
decision task. The maximization of entropy in their case is reinterpreted in terms
surprise minimization, i.e., minimize differences between likely outcomes and desired
outcomes [33]. Formally, this can be written as a minimization of the Kullback-Leibler
divergence between the DM prior preferences and posterior beliefs about the likely
outcomes given current observations. From a behavioral point of view, the DM is
keeping all options open in order to be least surprised with the outcome. Similarly
here, we can also argue that maximization of entropy is a reflection of the DM to
keep all options available for an accurate evaluation of the gamble, but instead we
will adhere mostly to our previous energy-based (i.e., value) picture.
The use of non-extensive entropy, instead of Shannon entropy, allows us to
treat a variety of paradoxes [10] that Prospect Theory cannot account for them.
From a physical point of view, using non-extensive entropy is more in tune with
the microscopic dynamics of neurons that gives rise to power-law distributions than
the exponential Boltzmann distribution [2, 72]. Therefore, the q-parameter of the
non-extensive entropy
Hq =
∑
i
pqi − pi
1− q , (6)
can be linked to intrinsic features of internal dynamics of neuronal networks, such as
fluctuations driven by the stimulus [15] or interactions between lotteries in a choice
task.
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3.1 The Model
Instead of a full-blown neurocomputational model, we aim to propose a model
that conceptually bridges both behavioral and neuronal approaches. This has three
aims. First, it adopts the behavioral responses as the ‘stuff’ to be explained. Second,
to build a model that is biophysically plausible and able to describe the macroscopic
properties of spiking neurons. Third, the model must be consistent with physical laws
of non-equilibrium thermodynamics.
The structure of the neuronal network reflects functional specialization (or mod-
ularity) and functional integration of the brain. Modularity allows us to treat a spe-
cific phase of a cognitive task locally while averaging the effect of the rest of the brain
on this local population of neurons. In the visual system, the most widely studied
system, neurons in the visual area V5 are very homogeneous and are only special-
ized in detecting motion. In the decision making problem, neurons in the OFC are
believed to be responsible for input, output value and chosen good processing [82].
Therefore, neurons in this area will be our focus, while the rest of the neurons in the
brain will be represented by parameters β and λ.
For any gamble G = (x1, p1;x2, p2; ..., xn, pn), a corresponding generalized
Meginnis’ utility is obtained by maximizing the non-extensive entropy using q-
weighted averages, Eq. 6, subject to the conditions
∑
i
p(xi) = 1, (7)
1∑
i p(xi)q
∑
i
p(xi)q (xi − xM) = 0, (8)
1∑
i p(xi)q
∑
p(xi)q (xi − xM)2 = σ2, (9)
where xM and σ are fixed real quantities that may be used to enforce value normal-
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ization in the response of neurons to a stimulus [90]. To keep our treatment simple
as in the previous section, we assume we are in a linear regime where value encoding
is linear, i.e., u(xi) = xi. Similarly, we will assume that there is a linear relationship
between energies needed (e.g., in the form of firing rates) to keep the gamble rep-
resentation active in the brain and corresponding outcomes. This representation is
supported by neurobiological findings. For example, Kennerley and Wallis [54] found
a sizable population of OFC neurons are modulated by three variables: the juice quan-
tity, the action cost, and the probability of receiving the juice at the end of the trial.
The firing rate increased with quantity and probability, as in the Padoa-Schioppa
[83] study. Therefore, (positive) value is understood in terms of energy expanded
to represent a positive outcome, or the motivation toward acquiring that outcome.
Hence, an approximate variational principle can be written for this ‘coarse-grained’
energy representation of the gamble as follows [68]
δ
[
Hq(p)− α
(∑
i
p(xi)− 1
)
−β
(∑
i
xi p(xi)q − xM
)
/
∑
i
p(xi)q (10)
−λ
(∑
i
(xi − xM)2 p(xi)q − σ2
)
/
∑
i
p(xi)q
]
= 0.
The parameters α, β, and λ are the associated Lagrange multipliers of the constraints,
Eq. (7-9). From a behavioral perspective, the parameter β determines the average
utility while λ is correlated with the variance in outputs or the amount of risk involved
in the gamble. The parameter q reflects the degree of deformation of subjective
probabilities compared to those in the stimulus, or a parameter reflecting long-range
interactions between the neuron populations associated with the various outcomes.
The limit q = 1 is the case treated in the previous section and represents independent
neuron populations. Therefore, from a dynamical point of view, on the neuronal level,
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the q-deformations are a signal that there are long-range correlated fluctuations in
the firing rates of the various populations. This is what we expect if coherence is
maintained among neurons that encode the same outcome in a gamble and between
choices [99]. It should be apparent from our formulation that we are not addressing
how the stimulus is being processed from the environment. This is a complex step that
will involve finding the true distribution of states (outcomes) of the neuronal network
driven by the external stimulus s, p(x|s). In this case, the variational principle will
involve a negative KL-divergence, Dq(p|p(x|s)), between the distribution p(x) and the
actual one. Instead, we are assuming that all the microscopic states of the neuronal
network are equally likely to be accessible. This is the microscopic origin of keeping
all options open by the DM.
If we rewrite the constraints in the simpler form
∑
m
pm = 1, (11)∑
m p
q
mum∑
m p
q
m
= U , (12)∑
m p
q
mu
2
m∑
m p
q
m
= V . (13)
The solution of this optimization, Eq. (11), gives [68]
pm =
1
Zq
[
1− (1− q)β∗ (um − U)− (1− q)λ∗
(
u2m − V
)] 1
1−q (14)
where the normalized parameters
β∗ = β∑
m p
q
m
, (15)
λ∗ = λ∑
m p
q
m
, (16)
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and
Zq =
∑
m
[
1− (1− q)β∗ (um − U)− (1− q)λ∗
(
u2m − V
)] 1
1−q . (17)
Using the solution of the variational principle, Eq. 14, in the entropy, Eq. 6, we find
that
β
∂U
∂β
= ∂
∂β
Hq [p] , (18)
and
λ
∂V
∂λ
= ∂
∂λ
Hq [p] . (19)
Both of these equalities lead to the following relations
∂Hq [p]
∂U = β, (20)
and
∂Hq [p]
∂V = λ. (21)
A new functional, C, that is optimal with respect to utility U and risk V is defined as
follows
C [U ,V ] = U + λ
β
V − 1
β
Hq [p] . (22)
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Using Eqs. (20,21), we can easily see that
δC
δU = 0, (23)
δC
δV = 0. (24)
Therefore, this is the new function that controls decision making processes in the
mind of the DM, where the parameters β and λ control the average value and the
spread of the options, respectively. These parameters are fixed by the distribution of
outcomes in the stimulus, and possibly the state of mind of the DM. The decision
function C is explicitly given by
C = ∑
m
pqm∑
l p
q
l
(
λ
β
u2m + um
)
− 1
β
Hq [p] . (25)
The function C is not necessarily convex, and that depends on the sign of both
parameters β and λ. Hence for negative ratio λ/β, the functional may have only
maximum values. This is the case we are interested in if C is to play the role of a
generalized utility function. This C function will be called an entropic utility. It must
be understood that this is not an actual utility, but more like a motivational effort
function. To understand this, we recall that we divided the brain into two parts;
one small part that includes the actual neuron populations just before a decision
is made, and a larger part, the rest of the brain, which constitutes in our picture
the environment. In essence, we are considering only the delayed stimulus response
only in the period just prior to the choice state. If we consider the utility part of
the C as the ’energy’ needed to represent the gamble states, then negative C may
be considered from the point of view of the environment the difference between the
’information’ cost needed to maintain the small population in their states by the rest
ENTROPIC DECISION MAKING 25
of the neurons in the brain. Therefore, it makes sense to minimize this difference and
choose the gamble that requires the least-effort to maintain, which is tantamount to
a cost-benefit analysis. It has been suggested that a function such as the negative
entropic utility is combined in a single signal in the brain that compares anticipated
benefit and relative costs [7, 88]. In an attempt to measure mental effort in an
arithmetic addition task, it was observed that effort and anticipated reward share the
same neuro-cortical areas [117]. The finding that high effort and high reward both
elicit strong firing rates in the ACC and striatum was not expected but is in-line with
the assumptions in this model that both tasks are energetically expensive and may be
the same. Using information theory arguments only, one would expect that low effort
tasks should elicit stronger responses, but that was not the case. From an energy
point of view, a maximum C, signals that the subsystem of neurons representing the
outcomes are in a non-equilibrium state.
As in the previous section, the parameters are determined so that the distribu-
tion p is a best estimate of the input distribution. For a fixed q, the parameters β
and λ are determined numerically solely from the distribution of outcomes and initial
conditions. The initial conditions β = λ = 0, q = 1 are used throughout this study
which reflects an unbiased mental state of the DM regarding the outcomes of the
gamble. We will be looking for solutions that maximize C. Therefore, λ/β will be
negative. Among the possible solutions for different q, the solution with the highest
q, 0 < q ≤ 1, is chosen (see Eq. 26). Encoding the variance of the distribution of out-
comes results in a normalization of the utility function of the values (or goods) of the
gamble. It must be stressed that even though Schwatenbeck et al. [102] included vari-
ance in their analysis using the free energy method of Friston and Kiebel [33], there
is nothing in common with the treatment presented here which is motivated instead
by energy considerations. Other work in decision making that was also inspired by
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thermodynamic is that of Orgetga and Braun [79], but no discussion of variance ap-
peared in that work and their motivations were very different from the ones presented
here. In either work, no attempt to discuss Birnbaum paradoxes was attempted. Our
model, while motivated by the good-based model of Padoa-Schioppa [80] of neurons,
it is also developed to address paradoxical behaviors such those discussed extensively
by Birnbaum [9].
3.2 Applications: the case of two-gambles
Consider two lotteries A and B similar to the ones treated earlier. Instead of
considering each lottery separately, we now treat them simultaneously through the
parameter q. Therefore, our lottery system is now represented in the mind by a joint
probability distribution p(A,B, θ). We will assume that both distributions, p(A) and
p(B) are independent but their effective entropy satisfies the q-entropy decomposition
formula,
Hq(A+B) = Hq(A) +Hq(B) + (1− q)Hq(A)Hq(B). (26)
The q-parameter is a dynamical parameter that microscopically may reflect the inter-
action of the neuronal populations encoding the gambles with the rest of the neuronal
network [15]. The q = 1 case is where both gambles are completely independent, but
it is also the case where their combined entropy is minimum for 0 < q ≤ 1. This
our motivation for choosing solutions with the largest q to minimize the combined
entropy of gambles in a choice experiment.
As an application of this proposed model, we apply it to the Allais paradox, the
violation of stochastic dominance, and other new discovered paradoxes by Birnbaum
[9] that violate PT. When comparing two gambles, we will choose the one that has the
ENTROPIC DECISION MAKING 27
higher C, if C is well-behaved in the sense discussed above. Moreover, the q-parameter
is the same if both gambles are compared simultaneously, but not necessarily the same
across different pairs of gambles. For example, in Allais paradox we have two pairs
of gambles that are presented to the DM at different times. From a physical point of
view, the two pairs represent two different stimuli , and therefore it is expected that
the q-parameters will be different too. But first, we take-up the example of the two
lotteries with equal expected values and equal entropies.
3.2.1 Gambles with equal expectation values and equal entropies.
As a first application of the entropic utility, we calculate the corresponding C-values
of both gambles that we discussed previously from a signal processing viewpoint.
The gambles are represented pictorially in Fig. 3. As we mentioned earlier, most
people choose gamble A which is less risky, but PT fails to reproduce this result for
probabilities not so close to 100%, unless values are also distorted. Similarly, TAX
does not predict that people prefer A unless values are also distorted. In this section,
we will show that with both probabilities and values kept undistorted, we still can
predict that people choose A over B. In a small sample of 19 people, we had only
three people choosing B, that is about 85% of people chose A.
Solving for q, we find several solutions. Among these solutions we choose the
one where the difference between the C-values is maximum. This difference can be
associated with motivational momentum toward the chosen state and away from the
suppressed state. In Fig. 4, we represent two cases where A is preferred to B from an
energetic point of view, where in case (a) the choice of A is much easier to achieve than
in case (b) which has a larger barrier between the two states. In this figure, we are
sketching a potential for an interactive theory, i.e., when both choices are entertained
simultaneously in the mind of the DM. The star in the figure represents the metastable
of the system right before a decision is made. Based on this criterion, the best values
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Figure 3 . Gambles with equal expected value of $9 and equal entropy, Hq (H1 =
−0.1 ln 0.1− 0.9 ln 0.9).
we found for this pair of gambles are shown in Table 1. Hence we reproduce the result
that most people choose gamble A and shy away from gamble B. According to the
relative signs of the β terms in both gambles, a DM who chooses gamble A over
gamble B is entropy seeking in gamble A but entropy averse for entropy B. From an
information theory point of view, this corresponds to increasing information about A
while decreasing (or erasing) information about B [85]. For both gambles, a decrease
in variance is energetically more favorable. This latter observation is always true in
this analysis and follows from the sign of λ/β which is always negative. A negative
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Figure 4 . A qualitative shape of a dynamical theory of choice. A and B represent two
possible choices. Making a decision between A and B should be more energetically
favorable in case (a) than in case (b). The mental state represented by a "*" is the
state we discuss in this work, i.e., just before the decision, where both options are
present.
’utility’ can be interpreted that from an energy viewpoint, the cost of the processing
of the information content exceeds that which is needed to maintain the state itself.
However, it is more natural to interpret the difference as the direction of motivational
momentum to drift toward one state and away from the other. The C value by itself
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Table 1
Equal EV and equal non-extensive entropy gambles, Fig. 3.
q = 0.944
Gamble A B
C 0.0982 -0.003
β -22.79 30.75
λ/β -0.099 -0.011
text
is meaningless in this model, only differences are physical.
The current analysis that led us to the conclusion that A is preferred to B ap-
pears to be very different from the signal analysis presented earlier. Both approaches
however lead to the same conclusion in agreement with measurements but contradicts
Prospect Theory and the TAX model. The signal analysis discussion was at a more
refined scale, where fluctuations caused by background noise was taken into account
and probabilities were left linear and Boltzmann-Shannon entropy was used, but en-
tropy is maximized in both cases. We expect a microscopic treatment along the lines
of Roxin and Ledberg [97] to include aspects of both approaches, and will include
higher order terms beyond variance, which is a discussion beyond the scope of this
work.
3.2.2 Allais Paradox. Next we apply our model to Allais paradox [3]. In
his work, Allais argued that taking into account variance in addition to expected
gain is essential to have a sound preference relation among gambles. To include
information about variance, Meginniss [70] found that including an entropy function
in addition to the expected utility function still provided a new utility function with
properties mostly similar to EUT. The parameter β in Eq. 1 is a fitting parameter
that is adjusted in such a way that Allais paradox can be explained on the basis of
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the new utility function. If the outcomes were normally distributed with variance
v, then the entropy of outcomes is simply proportional to ln v [24] and probably
this was the motivation for Meginnis to consider entropy as a measure of variance.
In our case, we are motivated on the basis of the space of outcomes embedded in
a much larger space of states, that of the whole brain network, and therefore the
constraints imposed on prospects become very important to reproduce results in-line
with behavior expectations. We follow the same analysis carried out in section 3.2.1.
The gambles that Allais proposed has the structure shown in Fig. 5. This
particular example of four gambles has been tested extensively by Birnbaum [10].
Figure 5 . The Allais paradox discussed in Birnbaum [10].
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Faced with a choice between gambles A and B, many people, 58%, would choose
A rather than B. The only reason for not choosing B is the risky 1% option of $2,
which is a very small risk, but people appear to favor sure outcomes in this case
and show characteristics of a risk averse behavior. If faced with gambles C and D,
many of the same people, 76% would choose gamble D since the $2 outcomes in
both gambles are approximately the same. Therefore, most people tend to show
characteristics of a risk-seeking behavior in this case. Because of a 1% outcome, we
have a complete reversal in behavior which is odd for a linear theory such as EUT to
satisfy. However, if nonlinearities in probabilities are incorporated, the behavior can
be explained. The linearity in probabilities of EUT makes common outcomes to be
irrelevant to the preference relation and coalescing outcome values by adding their
probabilities should not affect the preference relation either. The Allais paradox shows
that people behavior cannot satisfy these seemingly ’rational’ properties of EUT since
a linear theory does not allow a reversal in preference, i.e., if A is preferred to B, it
must be that C is preferred to D.
Birnbaum [10] attributes the failure of the Allais paradox to failure of coales-
cence of outcomes. From our point of view, it can be seen that coalescence modifies
the variance of the distribution of outcomes but not the mean of the distribution
which supports the idea of having variance as a quantity of relevance in decision
making.
Since we are making a comparison between two gambles simultaneously, and
we are looking for violations on an individual level, we expect the q-factor in both
distributions to be the same. However, in the Allais paradox we are looking for
consistency of decisions among two pairs. The q-factor is not necessarily the same
in both pairs, but in the Allais paradox example, we could have chosen a q-factor
that is common to both pairs and still find the largest difference between gambles for
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Table 2
Allais paradox, Fig. 5 in arbitrary units.
q = 0.713
Gamble A B
C 100 56
β -0.035 -0.059
λ/β 0 -4.51e-3
q = 0.378
Gamble D C
C 7.55e-3 -8.52
β 5.13 -0.0033
λ/β -4.99e-3 -7.27e-2
text
the reasons we discussed above to be consistent with what most people choose. But
this is not consistent with the physical picture we are advocating here. The q-factor
can be understood as a residual interaction parameter of the underlying microscopic
states of the gambles that are being compared only if both gambles are considered
part of the metastable state at the same time.
For the Allais paradox example in Fig. 5, the values we found that fits best
the physical picture advocated here are displayed in Table 2. The q-values found
here give probabilities that have the usual inverse ’S’-shape as in Prospect Theory.
In both pairs of gambles, the DM is risk averse in the sense that negative changes
in variance are more ’energetically’ favorable. Note that our interpretation of the
entropic utility function as an overall motivational momentum and that the extra
parts as costs related to the information content is reasonable. For example, in the
case of the certain lottery of $1M , the information content is zero and hence there
is no cost associated with it. However, differences are what is physically relevant
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here, since they give the direction of motivational momentum between the states:
44 = CA − CB > CD − CC = 8.5. According to this inequality, if reaction times
are measured, people will tend to respond faster when choosing A compared to when
choosing D. The negative sign of the parameter β implies that the higher value states
are being more weighted in the decision than lower value states.
3.2.3 Stochastic Dominance. Given two gambles A and B, if the proba-
bility of winning x or more in gamble A is greater than or equal to the probability of
winning x or more in gamble B for all values of x, and if this probability is strictly
higher for at least one value of x, we say that A stochastically dominates B. Therefore
mathematically, stochastic dominance will involve calculating a cumulative probabil-
ity density of a distribution. In short, stochastic dominance expresses the apparently
rational fact that more is better. This is the reason why stochastic dominance viola-
tions were not easily accepted. Birnbaum [9] extensively studied this violation under
many different frameworks, and obtained strong evidence that violation of stochastic
dominance is a very common behavior among DMs.
The violation of stochastic dominance is accounted for by the old version of
Prospect Theory [51], the TAX model [10], and the Attention model [50] for varying
reasons. We show here that the theory presented above also allows for stochastic
dominance to be violated. The pair of gambles we have chosen to discuss for this
violation is from Birnbaum [9]:
J = ($12, 0.10; $90, 0.05; $96, 0.85)
I = ($12, 0.05; $14, 0.05; $96, 0.90).
Gamble I stochastically dominates J because the probabilities of winning $14
or more and of $96 or more are greater in gamble I than J, and the probabilities of
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winning $12 or more and of $90 or more are the same in both gambles. This is easily
seen if both gambles are rewritten in the following way by splitting the outcomes:
J∗ = ($12, 0.05; $12, 0.05; $90, 0.05; $96, 0.85),
I∗ = ($12, 0.05; $14, 0.05; $96, 0.05; $96, 0.85).
If the two lotteries are compared term by term, it is clear that according to the laws
of probability, lottery I should be preferred to lottery J . But this contradicts what
most people choose to do. However, from a heuristic point of view, it is easy to see
why most people would prefer to play lottery J if they want to maximize their chances
of winning bigger amount of money. People choose J over I presumably because J
has two ways to produce a ‘very good’ outcome but I has only one way (as if the
outcomes are equally likely even though they are not) [13]. This latter argument by
itself indirectly shows the relevance of variance in the decision process, since both I∗
and J∗ have the same entropy [102], but in the initial set-up, J has higher entropy
than that of I. Clearly linear operations on the gambles, as described here, is not a
step that the human brain uses to compute the effective value of each gamble, and
variance brings the minimal nonlinearity needed in the computations to make them
align with human behavior. According to Birnbaum [10]’s TAX model, people fail
to detect stochastic dominance because the coalescence or splitting of branches with
equal outcomes is not a valid step. From the point of view of our model, coalescence is
clearly violated because of the nonlinearities in the probabilities and in the outcomes.
For the pair of gambles J and I displayed in Fig. 6, Birnbaum [9] conducted 16
different studies over the years. The violation of stochastic dominance was significant
in all of them. The theory we proposed here also shows that violations of stochastic
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Figure 6 . A lottery that violates stochastic dominance [9].
violation is valid for all 0.33 ≤ q ≤ 1. The q-value, q = 0.801 we have chosen is the
one that also works for a transparent stochastic dominance example related to the
I − J pair, but this does not have to be the case as we discussed above. The pair of
gambles J1 and J [9],
J1 = ($12, 0.10; $96, 0.90)
are easily seen to satisfy a dominance relation where J1 stochastically dominates J .
The chosen q-value for the probability distributions respects stochastic dominance for
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the pair J1 − J and violates stochastic dominance for I − J .
Table 3
Violation of stochastic dominance [9], Fig. 6.
q = 0.801
Gamble J I
C 6.5 -266.1
β 0.554 0.0098
λ/β -9.68e-3 -3.86e-2
text
The parameters derived for the I − J pair are given in Table 3. Again using
our analogy with energy, the relative costs associated with the information content of
gamble I are much more than that of gamble J. This is reflected in the negative sign
of C. According to our model, the reason people prefer J to I has to do more with the
cost of information associated with the gamble rather than its utility, or differently,
people are less motivated to drift to gamble I. Since in our model we are assuming
a linear relationship between utility of outcomes and energy, the opposite of C, −C,
should be interpreted from the point of view of the rest of the neuronal network as the
excess energy needed to maintain the encoding of the gamble in the brain. It is this
excess of energy that is minimized by the (computational part of the) brain. So it is
important to remember that in classic descriptive theories, the utility is synonymous
with the DM, but here utility is just the energy needed to represent the gamble in
one part of the cortex.
Finally, we would like to make further comments on the choice of the parameter
q. According to the physical picture advocated here, the q parameter should reflect
the interaction of the two lotteries that are being considered and no other. For each
pair of gambles, we need just to find q that gives the largest difference between the
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two gambles. In this case q = 1 should have been chosen for the IJ gamble. The
parameters are still approximately the same and our conclusions won’t be affected.
For q = 0.801, ∆CJ−I = 273, while for q = 1, ∆CJ−I = 275. In general however, we
should choose q independently for each pair of lotteries. This is what we would do
for the remaining paradoxes.
3.2.4 Birnbaum Paradoxes. In Savage’s subjective utility theory, the
"sure-thing" principle is an important assumption in the theory. The principle states
that if a DM prefers A to B given that event C occurred or not-C occurred, then
the DM should still prefer A to B even if the DM does not know anything about C
[101]. This principle is now only of general historical interest since people do not obey
this principle even in it weakest form that of branch independence which has been
shown to be violated [13]. Branch independence implies that outcomes or branches
with equal outcomes should not matter when comparing two gambles. Birnbaum
paradoxes are a manifestation of violations of branch independence and coalescence
[14].
To further show that coalescence is at the root of these violations, Birnbaum
[9] studied many gambles that he expected to violate Prospect Theory. In this paper,
we will address the violations of upper and lower cumulative independence (Table 3
in Birnbaum [9]). For outcomes 0 < z < x′ < x < y < y′ < z′, and probabilities p, q,
and r, upper cumulative independence is expressed as follows:
S ′ = (x, p; y, q; z′, r) < R′ = (x′, p; y′, q; z′, r) (27)
⇒ S ′′′ = (x, p+ q; y′, r) < R′′′ = (x′, p; y′, q + r).
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For lower cumulative independence, we have
S = (z, r;x, p; y, q) > R = (z, r;x′, p; y′, q) (28)
⇒ S ′′ = (x′, r; y, p+ q) > R′′ = (x′, r + p; y′, q).
All theories with weights that depend on a cumulative distribution of outcomes , in-
cluding Prospect Theory and rank dependent utilities, satisfy these properties. These
two properties are not dependent on the inverse S-shape of the weight function, and
the reader is referred to Birnbaum and Navarrete [14] for more details about how
these two properties are derived. Therefore, to show the robustness of the violations
of both of these properties, Birnbaum employed different forms of the stimuli to min-
imize any framing effects. His TAX model is able to reproduce these new violations.
In the following, we show that these new paradoxes can be also explained within our
model.
Upper cumulative independence: Upper cumulative independence (UCI)
were predicted by TAX but violated by PT. An example of UCI is displayed in Fig. 7.
For the gambles, we will use the same notation as that of Birnbaum [9]. The violations
of UCI are due to failure of coalescence and branch independence. According to PT,
if a person prefers R′ over S ′, then that person should also prefer R′′′ over S ′′′. Here
S ′′′ is obtained from S ′ by coalescing the lower two outputs, while R′′′ is obtained
from R′ by coalescing the upper outcomes. In the 12 studies reported by Birnbaum
testing UCI, he found that about 69% of people preferred R′ to S ′ while about 63%
of people switched preference in the second pair of gambles, i.e., most chose S ′′′.
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Figure 7 . Upper cumulative independence: pair of gambles no. 10 and no. 9 in
Birnbaum [9].
The parameters that are consistent with a violation of UCL are shown in Table
4. For each pair of gambles, the q-value corresponds to the maximum difference in
utilities and are in the expected preference order as chosen by people. In comparing
gambles R′ and S ′, the difference is ∆CR′S′ = 36.72, while that between the gambles
S ′′′ and R′′′ is ∆CS′′′R′′′ = 6.37× 103. Therefore, there is a reversal in preferences.
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Table 4
Violation of upper cumulative independence of pair of gambles (10,9) in Fig. 7, [9].
q = 1
Gamble R′ S ′
C -3.23 -39.95
β 0.19 0.038
λ/β -9.47e-3 -1.21e-2
q = 0.368
Gamble S ′′′ R′′′
C 27.8 -6. 34 103
β 3.70 3.3e-4
λ/β -7.23e-3 -0.70
text
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Figure 8 . Upper cumulative independence: pair of gambles no. 12 and no. 14 in
Birnbaum [9].
The second pair of gambles discussed by Birnbaum is shown in Fig. 8. The
parameters corresponding to this pair of gambles are given in Table 5. According to
the experimental measurements, about 52% of people chose R′ over S ′, while about
71% of people chose S ′′′ over R′′′, which is a violation of UCI. The much higher
percentage in the S ′′′ > R′′′ is reflected in the magnitude of differences of entropic
utilities, ∆CR′S′ = 9.14, for the first pair and ∆CS′′′R′′′ = 7.91 × 102 for the second
pair of lotteries.
ENTROPIC DECISION MAKING 43
Table 5
Violation of upper cumulative independence of pair of gambles (12,14) in Fig. 8, [9].
q = 1
Gamble R′ S ′
C 1.65 -7.5
β 0.33 0.092
λ/β -9.40e-3 -1.0e-2
q = 0.737
Gamble S ′′′ R′′′
C 32.33 -7.58e+2
β -8.29 3.13e-3
λ/β -6.88e-3 -9.30e-2
text
Lower cumulative independence: The pair of gambles we use to show vi-
olations of lower cumulative independence (LCI) is from Birnbaum [10]. The gambles
were studied under 12 different frames [9]. According to LCI, if a person chooses S
over R, then that person should also choose S ′′ over R′′. Prospect Theory satisfies
LCI.
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Figure 9 . Lower cumulative independence: pair of gambles no. 17 and no. 20 in
Birnbaum [9].
The pair of gambles are shown in Fig. 9 with the corresponding parameters
in Table 6. According to the measurements, about 51% of people prefer S over
R, while about 65% prefer R′′ over S ′′ which is a violation of LCI. The parameters
determined from our theory for this pair of gambles are given in Table 5. The effective
motivational effort, C, is larger for theR′′S ′′ pair than for theRS pair, ∆CSR = 0.53 <
∆CR”S” = 0.92. This is indirectly reflected in the percentage numbers quoted above,
which imply that it is cognitively easier for the process R′′ > S ′′ to be processed than
that of S > R. Note that according to our theory, we cannot conclude for certain
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that CR”S = 6.96 is larger than CS′′R = 6.54 since all the parameters will be different,
but what we can conclude is that the reaction time to choose S should be slower
than that of choosing R′′. Only a fully dynamical theory, with higher-order terms
in values, can account for these differences in transition rates. In the next section,
we propose some ideas on how to approach this problem using the Maxwell ’demon’
analogy [85].
Table 6
Violation of lower cumulative independence of gambles (17,20) in Fig. 9, [9].
q = 0.506
Gamble S R
C 3.74 3.21
β 0.128 0.363
λ/β -1.0e-2 -1.0e-2
q = 0.974
Gamble R′′ S ′′
C 10.7 9.75
β 77.76 72. 6
λ/β -9.26e-3 -1.56e-2
text
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4 An Interactive Model for Choice with Memory
Why it is not enough to only compare lotteries by calculation of expected utility
separately? While this approach appears to work in many cases, it does not work
when decoy effects or framing effects are included. For example, it is known that
questions posed in terms of losses instead of gains may reverse the choice made by
the DM. Similarly, addition of irrelevant options can affect the choice [119]. At the
neuronal level, it has also been detected in single trials that changes in preferences
can occur right before the commitment to a decision [55]. Moreover, we know that
inhibiting neurons play a role in the dynamics leading to a decision, but a full picture
of the mechanisms of choice are still not known [45, 125]. Therefore, extensions of
choice mechanisms that include interaction among the different options is desirable.
So far, we have been able to argue based on a physical picture and plausible
physical arguments to present an account of behavioral decision making under risk.
The results we were able to obtain were very encouraging, but this is still far from a
physically sound theory that can bridge the gap between behavioral and neurobiolog-
ical processes. Another improvement of the treatment presented above is to propose a
scheme where interactions between gambles that are being compared simultaneously
are included in the analysis. To achieve this, we need to account for other processes
that take part in a decision process such as attention and memory, and hence extra
parameters will need to be included.
The need to incorporate attention in models that explain cognitive tasks is well
documented [86]. For example, eye-tracking analysis of the dynamics of decision
making shows that attention increases with increasing probability and value [29, 50].
This attention process will be regulated by another population of neurons in addition
to the populations considered above that encoded only the gambles. However, to
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include attention in our model a memory element is needed to be part of the model.
This memory works as a register of the transitions that are unconsciously or con-
sciously being made between the various branches of the two gambles to arrive to a
decision. The actual decision step was only included in an indirect manner in the
above discussion. To improve on this picture, we use the Maxwell demon analogy in
nonequilibrium statistical mechanics [66]. Just to remind the reader, Maxwell demon
is an "intelligent" being suggested by Maxwell that circumvented the second law of
thermodynamics [69]. The demon used information about every particle of a gas in
equilibrium to decrease entropy which is a violation of the second law of thermody-
namics. In a classic paper, Szilard [110] showed that when the memory of the demon
is included part of the system, entropy can no longer decrease. This work established
for the first time the physical nature of information. The reader is referred to the
review by Leff and Rex [61] for more details. For our purposes, the demon will be
the equivalent of the working memory of the DM. The Maxwell demon lowers the
entropy of the subsystem by directing the flow of particles in the gas following a
control protocol. Similarly, the WM will be involved in directing the ’flow’ of atten-
tion between the states (branches) of the different gambles. In our decision problem,
there are transitions of attention within each gamble and across gambles. Both of
these types of transitions will be manipulated by the demon using a Master equation
approach with probability transition rates determined from the nonextensive entropy
approach. One of the candidates for the Maxwell demon in the brain could be the
thalamic reticular nucleus (TRN). The TRN is known to control traffic between the
cortex and thalamus [58]. It has also been shown that RTN plays a role in regulating
attention between competing visual and auditory stimuli [123]. This means that TRN
plays some role in deciding which information is more relevant to the goal set in the
brain.
ENTROPIC DECISION MAKING 48
4.1 Master equation approach to attention
From an energetic viewpoint, consider two lotteries L and R, the population
of neurons representing each gamble will form an instantaneous equilibrium, and
during the deliberation phase of the decision making, the decision maker is assumed
to explore all possible states by a feedback process that also sustains the signal in
the absence of the stimulus. The feedback loop process is similar to the rehearsal
component of the Atkinson and Shiffrin [5] model for short-term memory. For the
decision to be made, both gambles must remain active in a short-term buffer in
prefrontal cortex such as in OFC and may be other regions of the cortex. In our
memory, both implicit and explicit attentions are involved, and may span different
time scales depending on the relative values of the parameters that we determined
earlier in the entropic utility approach.
In the deliberation phase, shifting attention among all possible states will be
part of the dynamical process that will upset the local equilibrium and drive the
system toward the chosen state. The analogy with a chemical reaction in the presence
of an enzyme is very close to the picture we are adopting her. Schematically, the
dynamic of decision is represented in Fig. 10. Each well represents a lottery with
transitions represented by thin arrows, while fat arrows represent transitions between
states. The demon is represented here by a tape that represents bias or an energy-
feedback loop that facilitates the decision to proceed in the least resistant path in
the neuronal network and keeps track of the transitions made between L and R. We
will not treat the whole dynamic of the system in a self-consistent way, but we will
introduce the minimum ingredients needed to account for memory of the demon. The
discussion of entropy manipulation by WM will not be discussed here, but may give
a better picture of how entropy generation is transported across the different regions
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of the brain. Instead, we will slightly extend the previous discussion and focus on
accounting for the overall probabilities of choosing either gamble given the outcomes
and weights of the different branches in a pair of gambles.
Figure 10 . The system is made of two subsystems, L and R, that represent the
lotteries. The tape represents the memory of the mind as it juggles between the
two subsystems. The distribution of L’s and R’s in the outgoing tape represents the
distribution of choices made by people and represented by variable θ = 0, 1. Here it is
assumed that people are first presented with the lottery at the left. So initially, people
register lottery L in their memory, and then afterwards decide to stay in L or move
attention to R. Moving attention away from L is equivalent to erasing information
about L. In this particular example, a single time step is assumed to start always
from the L state.
In the sensorimotor region, different action options are represented in parallel
[39]. Hence, it is reasonable to represent different options with different states in
parallel. Moreover as we discussed above, there is some evidence in a two-choice
reaching task that neural activity in the primary cortex (M1) and dorsal premotor
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(PMd) regions does not integrate information, it just tracks the state of the sensory
state [111]. In value-based decision tasks, we have less evidence that evidence accu-
mulation is the main pathway for reaching a decision. Given these uncertainties, a
master equation approach to the probability distribution of the ’macroscopic’ states
of gambles is proposed here [34].
For a Markovian system, the rate of change of probabilities is given by
dpi
dt
=
∑
j
pjWji − piWij (29)
where Wij is the transition probability rate from the i-th state to the j-th state.
The transition probabilities within each gamble are determined from the probability
distributions found earlier, while the transition between gambles are caused by the
demon, which are assumed constant for simplicity. These transition rates give rise to a
flow of entropy in or out of the coarse-grained subsystem describing the gambles to the
rest of the brain. The picture we adopt here is very similar to the one used in systems
with thermodynamic and information processes [85]. Therefore, the introduction of
the demon will drive the subsystem to a non-equilibrium state. The coefficients Wij
will be interpreted in terms of attention [78].
To keep our model manageable, we will assume local detailed balance for tran-
sitions within a gamble. This implies that the the transition probability rate from
state, Wij( i → j) satisfy the following relation between any pair of outcomes or
states:
Wijp
eq
i = Wjip
eq
j . (30)
Fortunately for us, this non-equilibrium state can achieve a steady state which makes
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us avoid introducing time in the decision problem explicitly. At the individual level,
this is a poor approximation, since we are assuming that the DM is taking infinitely
many time steps to reach a decision. However, by ergodicity this final distribution
is the same as that achieved by an infinitely large sample of individual brains with
arbitrary initial states. Therefore, the reported distribution of choices between two
lotteries is closely related to the equilibrium distribution that we calculate in each
choice task.
In the nonextensive entropy model, this leads to the following expression
Wij
Wji
=
[
1− (1− q)∑ν λ∗ν(Oν,i − uν)
1− (1− q)∑ν λ∗ν(Oν,j − uν)
] 1
1−q
(31)
where the λ∗ν are the normalized Lagrange multipliers and
∑
iOν,i = uν is the νth
constraint on the subsystem. We choose these transition rates as
Wij = Ω(β, λ)
[
1− (1− q)∑ν λ∗ν(Oν,i − uν)
1− (1− q)∑ν λ∗ν(Oν,j − uν)
] 1
2
1
1−q
, (32)
where Ω is the transition rate of attention within a single lottery. If transition state
theory is any guidance, we expect to have Ω of the same order as 1/β. Hence both
parameters Ω and ω represent the frequency of shifting attention among the outcomes
of a single lottery and between lotteries. It may be possible that an eye fixation
analysis can be used to estimate some of these parameters [96]. In addition to these
two parameters, we also need a distribution in working memory of the two gambles.
This distribution will eventually represent the belief or information gained after the
deliberation (i.e, feedback) process. Based on this distribution, the working memory
will erase any information associated with the discarded lottery (i.e., decrease in
entropy), and ’focus’ attention on the chosen lottery. This information is then relayed
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to a new population of neurons in the OFC that encode the chosen state [84, 98].
Padoa et al. were able to identify a different set of neurons that encoded the chosen
good (juice). Our model is based on his findings, and chosen gamble is represented
in the working memory (WM), or demon. This is best illustrated by treating various
examples.
4.2 Applications II
4.2.1 Stochastic Dominance. The first example we treat is that of
stochastic dominance discussed earlier. Since we are addressing switching of atten-
tion among the various possible outcomes of both lotteries, we need first to set-up
the possible paths along which these transitions of attention can be activated. The
working memory will play the role of a traffic controller between various states that
are usually the focus of attention. The circuit that corresponds to the two lotteries
in Fig. 6 is shown in Fig. 11, and is represented in an abstract value-based space.
In addition to the probability transition rates, Wij, that we already discussed, there
is a new element in this network that corresponds to the working memory that is
responsible for new attentional guidance between the various options available to the
DM. Similar processes were observed in the visual system where the WM modulates
competitive interactions between items in the visual field before a selection is made
[57]. Therefore, our attention model is very plausible physically. The word atten-
tion is mostly associated with a conscious action, but it is also known that attention
can be implicit. For example, studies on the effect of emotions on explicit task-
related attention processes are well documented, and showed that implicit attention
to marginal information (stimulus) is possible [30]. In our model, we assume both
types of attention mechanisms are involved in a decision task.
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Figure 11 . Stochastic dominance circuit: Choice between gamble J =
($96, 0.85, $90, 0.05, $12, 0.10) and gamble I = ($96, 0.90, $14, 0.05, $12, 0.05). The
gamble J is stochastically dominated by gamble I [9]. The straight arrows (red on-
line) represent transitions between the various gains. The green (online) curly arrows
represent transitions between the two options I and J. The working memory (WM)
stores and controls transitions between I and J.
For this particular example, there are four value states, and all have to be
maintained in the working memory simultaneously. This is already a very taxing
process because of the limited capacity of the short term memory (STM). It has
been suggested that on average, a person can hold concurrently around four to seven
chunks of information in STM [71, 25, 1]. The parameter ω represents the switching
rate between the states $14 ⇔ $90, while  is a constant distribution that may
represent the degree of bias or belief of the DM towards the decision states. Hence ω
and  are associated with the WM (or demon). In suggesting this particular circuit,
we are assuming that the DM really focuses on states and not gambles. If the most
probable state happens to be in gamble A, then gamble A is chosen. Therefore, the
mental representation we have adopted is the following [93]. The Maxwell demon lives
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in the DM’s brain [69], and it is the WM of the DM that ’drives’ the excited neurons
to a certain goal state based on the information just acquired and the subjective
information that is already stored in the mind. The demon’s job is to settle on a
single state as soon as possible given the subjective state of the mind. This process is
equivalent to ’erasing’ information from the region of the brain that is directly involved
in processing the external information. Hence, upon decision, entropy decrease may
happen in the WM of the demon, but overall, entropy increases in the whole brain
network.
The rate equations associated with this network are
p˙1 = ω p2 − ω(1− )p1 +W31p3 −W13p1 +W41p4 −W14p1,
p˙2 = −ω p2 + ω(1− )p1 +W42p4 −W24p2 +W32p3 −W23p2, (33)
p˙3 = W23p2 −W32p3 +W13p1 −W31p3 +W43p4 −W34p3,
p˙4 = W14p1 −W41p4 +W34p3 −W43p4 +W24p2 −W42p4,
where the probabilities satisfy p1 + p2 + p3 + p4 = 1, and are not equal to the ini-
tial probabilities. The initial (i.e., stimulus) probabilities are now encoded in the
transition rates Wij according to Eq. 32.
For the working memory, we adopt the simplest model. The bits 1 and 0
are associated with states $90 and $40, respectively. The choice of these two states
appear arbitrary, but what is important is that they do not belong to the same lottery.
Otherwise, their choice does not have a significant effect on the final distribution. For
simplicity, the incoming bits are assumed to have probability p(1) = . The bits
interact for a period T with the network according to the rate equations above, Eq.
33, before the next bit arrives. After the interaction period, the network evolves to a
new state such that the value outcome $90 has a new probability, p1. The change in
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p1 will be reflected in the outgoing part of the tape such that pout(1) = p1/(p1 + p2).
This system reaches a non-equilibrium steady state with
pout(1) =
0.46k1 + 0.58k2 + ω (0.21 + 0.12k2/k1 + 0.09k1/k2)
k1 + 1.24k2 + ω (0.21 + 0.12k2/k1 + 0.09k1/k2)
, (34)
where k1 and k2 are the corresponding transition probability rates for J and I, re-
spectively. From reaction rate theory, the ratios of the transition probabilities are
expected to be such that k1/k2 ∝ |β2/β1|ν , with ν > 0 [42]. This gives us an idea of
the magnitude of possible ratios which clearly can affect the probabilities of choices
made in an important way. If we take this ratio to be 1, the probability of state $90
in the memory becomes
pout(1) = 0.46
1 + 0.41ω/Ω
1 + 0.19ω/Ω , (35)
where k1 = k2 = Ω. The function in Eq. 35 is displayed in Fig. 12. Therefore, for
small ratios of ω/Ω, state J can never be chosen according to our scheme. In the
opposite limit of this ratio, the state $90 becomes abundant in the memory, or in
other words, attention is more focused on this state than other states. Physically,
this limit corresponds to very fast decisions. However, this latter approximation is
very poor given that according to the entropic utility solution, the ratio of βJ/βI ≈ 50
which is far larger than 1. Note that according to the limited capacity of the working
memory, the DM cannot keep track in the STM of all the options available. Therefore
tracking few options in the WM will be the most plausible way that occurs during a
decision process.
While we considered this network solution as occurring within a single brain,
this need not be the case. We may equally use each bit to be associated with a
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different person. Hence in this way the steady solution corresponds to the choice
of the overall population, and pout(1) corresponds to the percentage of population
choosing gamble J. In this case, if the population starts from the $90 state upon
being asked to choose between I and J , only about 67% of them will end up choosing
J . According to Birnbaum’s measurements, 65.8% of the population choose J over I
in 12 studies [9].
Figure 12 . Violation of Stochastic Dominance: The probability of state $90 which
corresponds to bit 1 in the memory as calculated from the viewpoint of the memory
(demon). The data is for kI = kJ = Ω. —
4.2.2 Allais paradox. First, we treat the pair of gambles A and B. The
circuit for this case is shown in Fig. 13-a. Here the transition rate, ω, between the
$2M state and $1M state is influenced by the presence of the certain state of $1M .
Hence, ω will be proportional to 1/|βA|. Since people will focus their attention on the
relative chances of receiving $2M , a naive estimation is to evaluate p($2M)/(p($1M)+
ENTROPIC DECISION MAKING 57
p($2M)) which is approximately equal to 10%, the same as in the original B gamble
since the $2 state is barely relevant. Therefore, we expect including the certain state
to make receiving $2M less probable than receiving $1M even in the most pessimistic
case that of  = 0. To calculate the chances of choosing the state of $2M , and the
gamble B, we first write the rate equations for the circuit.
(a) Allais AB (b) Allais CD
Figure 13 . Allais paradox [10]: (a) Allais Paradox: A vs. B. The A lottery
consists of $1M option with certainty, while the B lottery has three options with
($2, 0.01), ($1M, 0.89) and ($2M, 0.10). (b) Allais Paradox: C vs. D. The C lottery
consists of ($1M, 11%) and ($2, 89%) options, while the D lottery has two options
with ($2M, 10%) and ($2, 90%).
Let p1, p2 and p3 the probabilities of the $2M , $1M , and $2 states, respectively.
The rate of change of these probabilities for the lotteries A-B are
p˙1 = W21p2 +W31p3 −W13p1 −W12p1 + ω p2 + ω(1− )p1
p˙2 = W32p3 −W23p2 +W12p1 −W21p2 − ω p2 + ω(1− )p1 (36)
p˙3 = W31p1 −W31p3 +W23p2 −W32p3,
where ω is the frequency of transitions between the two lotteries. Therefore it is as-
sumed to reflect the process of attending to the various outcome values. The outgoing
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probability of having a bit of 1 in the memory after the coupling between the memory
and network that encodes the gambles is
pout(1) =
p1
p1 + p2
= W23W31 + (W31 +W32) (W21 + ω )
W21W31 +W23W31 + +W13W32 + (W31 +W32)(W12 + ω)
.
= 0.898
1 + 0.31  ω
kB
1 + 0.28 ω
kB
. (37)
Thus according to this representation, the relative probability of the $1M state com-
pared to the $2M state in the registered memory is at worst 75%, with complete bias
toward the $2M state, i.e.,  = 0 and ω
kB
≈ 12(kA + kB). The treatment discussed
here can be interpreted differently. If we assume that each time step corresponds to
a different DM, and that the $1M state attracts the attention of each DM the same
way. We estimate in this case that only 8% of the population will choose to play lot-
tery B and not A. This estimate is very close to the one reported in Kahneman and
Tversky [51], about 12%, but far smaller than the 42% measured by Birnbaum [10].
This latter experiment was not part of his extensive studies reported in Birnbaum
[9].
The circuit for the two lotteries C and D in the brain is schematically repre-
sented in Fig. 13-b. Similar to previous set of lotteries, we write the rate equations
for the CD network in the value-based space of choices. The rate of change of prob-
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abilities in this coupled system are governed by
p˙1 = W31p3 −W13p1 − ω p1 + ω(1− )p2
p˙2 = W32p2 −W23p2 + ω p1 − ω(1− )p2 (38)
p˙3 = W13p1 −W31p3 +W23p2 −W32p3.
The probability of bit 1 in the memory after many interaction periods with the net-
work representing both gambles is
pout(1) =
p2
p1 + p2
= W13W32 + ω (W31 +W32)
W23W31 +W13W32 + ω(W31 +W32)
. (39)
Using the probability transition rates, we have
pout(1) =
0.92 +  ω
kC
(
1
3 + 0.365
kC
kD
)
2.01 + ω
kC
(
1
3 + 0.365
kC
kD
) . (40)
For this pair of lotteries, Birnbaum [10] gave 76% as the percentage of people who
chose lottery D over lottery C. This pair of gambles were not part of the 12 studies
we quoted above. To get a percentage close to the measured value, the population
must have a bias toward the $2M state, i.e.,  > 0.5, and for average interaction
periods between the WM and the network much shorter than the transition times
between the outcomes of the D gamble. The requirement of bias is not necessarily
a weakness of the model, but is considered a prediction in this instance. Diffusion-
based models [92], for-example, require a bias parameter that needs to be varied
to achieve agreements in two-choice decision tasks. From Table 2, we see that the
focus of attention, i.e., 1/kD is much longer than that of gamble C. Therefore, if
the interaction period between memory and network is much larger than the average
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transition times between outcomes of gamble C, but less than that of gamble D, we
can attain probabilities in the range measured by the experiment. These are details
that can be checked in future measurements.
4.2.3 Birnbaum Paradoxes. Next we suggest an interactive circuit for the
Birnbaum paradoxes.
Upper Cumulative Independence. For the upper cumulative indepen-
dence test, we use the pair of gambles 10 and 9 in Table 3 of Birnbaum [9]. As
we observed above, we will interpret our results from two angles, that of a single DM
or a population of DMs.
(a) R’S’ (b) R”’S”’
Figure 14 . Upper cumulative independence: (a) R′ versus S ′ choice 10 in Table 3,
(b) S ′′′ versus R′′′′ choice 9 in Table 3 in [9]
The initial probability of bit 1 is pin(1) = . After interaction with the bit, the
new probability of bit 1 in the R′S ′ circuit becomes
pout(1) =
0.5 + 0.14  ω
k1
(
1 + k1
k2
)
1 + 0.14 ω
k1
(1 + k1k2)
(41)
This functional dependence is plotted in Fig. 15 for different values of the initial
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distribution of the bits 0 and 1, and how fast memory manipulation is being carried
out. Clearly, in this case for  = 0.5, the attention scheme does not work since it
can’t decide on its own which state to choose. A slight bias is needed for a choice
to be made. According to the measurements of Birnbaum [9] averaged over his 12
studies, 69% of people chose gamble R′ over gamble S ′. If we adopt the view that
every interaction interval between the demon and the gambles are independent and
correspond to different people, the probability of outgoing bit 1 should be closely
aligned with the percentage of people choosing R′ in the limit of an infinite sample
of people. Therefore, according to Eq. 41, to achieve comparable percentages, the
population should have an initial bias toward the higher value state of $98 in lottery
R′. As an example, if we take k1/k2 ≈ βR′/βS′ ≈ 5, Table 4, and choose the rate of
information manipulation by the WM to be approximately ω/k1 = 2/5, i.e., midway
between the intra-transition rates, we find pout(1) ≡ 0.63.
A similar calculation for the second pair of gambles, R′′′S ′′′ of test 9 in Birnbaum
[9] gives for the probability of outgoing bit 1 after interaction with the network of the
gamble
pout(1) =
1.5 +  ω/3k2 (1 + 1.5 k2/k1)
2.17 + ω/3k2 (1 + 1.5 k2/k1)
. (42)
This function is shown in Fig. 16 for various values of the initial bit 1. The
percentage value of the population that chose S ′′′ over lottery R′′′ averaged over 12
studies was about 63%. Such percentage can be understood either as a bias toward
the $40 state or faster shifting of attention between gambles than that within gamble
S ′′′. The latter means that more attention is paid to the chosen gamble.
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Figure 15 . Upper cumulative independence in the interactive model: R′ versus S ′ of
test no. 10 in Table 3 of Birnbaum [9]. The data is for kS′/kR′ = 5 . —
The plot is shown for the case when kS′′′/kR′′′ ≈ 0 , which is implied by entropic
utility, Table 5. This result is physically plausible. The parameters ω and  reflect
cognitive effort by the WM, this implies that the memory can interact very little with
the network and induce a decision. Therefore, compared to the decision made on the
R′S ′ pair, it is easier to make a decision on this pair. Again, this is very reasonable
given the complexity of the first pair. Since the measured probabilities of the first
decision are higher than this current one, this may lead us to believe that it is easier
to make a decision on the first pair rather than this one. From the structure of both
pairs, it is very difficult to agree with this interpretation, and we believe that the
conclusion from this model is more plausible in this case.
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Figure 16 . Violation of upper cumulative independence: S ′′′ vsR′′′′ choice 9 in Table
3 in [9]. The data is for kS′′′/kR′′′ = 0.
Lower Cumulative Independence. Finally, we address the violation of
lower cumulative independence with this transfer of attention approach, and discuss
how this violation can be understood from the WM memory manipulation of the
regions encoding the stimulus, i.e., the gambles. Lower cumulative independence
implies that if people prefer S over R, then they should also prefer S ′′ over R′′.
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For lower cumulative independence, Birnbaum studied the following pair
of lotteries in studies 17 and 20 of his Table 3 [9]. The gambles are R =
($3, 0.90; $12, 0.05; $96, 0.05) and S = ($3, 0.90; $48, 0.05; $52, 0.05) for the first pair
of choices, and R′′ = ($12, 0.95; $96, 0.05) and S ′′ = ($12, 0.90; $52, 0.10) for the sec-
ond pair of gambles. The circuits for the two pairs of gambles are shown in Fig.
17.
For the pair of gambles RS, the probability of having bit 1 in the memory after
interaction with the network is given by
p(S) = 0.5
1 + 0.20  ω
k1
(1 + k1
k2
)
1 + 0.10 ω
k1
(1 + k1
k2
)
. (43)
The parameters of the entropic utility for this pair of gambles suggests that the ratio
k1/k2 ≈ 3
(a) RS (b) R”S”
Figure 17 . Lower cumulative independence circuits: (a) R versus S lotteries: Table
3 , test no. 17 in [9] (b) R” versus S” lotteries: Table 3, test no. 20 in [9]).
According to Birnbaum ’s measurements, there was approximately 52% of the
population who chose S over R. According to the suggested circuit, a preference of
S over R will need at least some bias towards the state S, which is shown in Fig. 18.
Moreover, this bias will be accentuated for higher ω/kS (k1 = kS), i.e., when the WM
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Figure 18 . Lower cumulative independence: R vs S lotteries. Probability of choosing
R as a function of the parameters ω, k1, and  ([9], test 17). The data is for k1/k2 = 3.
——
interacts with the S-side of network more often than with R. This is again a plausible
result which means that most of the attention is focused on the S gamble, and the
more attention a gamble is attended to, the more often it is chosen. Hence, in spite
of the simplicity of the model, the details of the prediction is something that can be
tested.
For the second pair of gambles R′′ and S ′′ in test 20 of Birnbaum [9], the
probability of the bit 1 in the memory after the interaction with the network is
p(R′′) = 0.321
1 +  ω
k2
(0.485 + k23k1 )
1 + ω
k2
(0.156 + 0.11k2
k1
)
. (44)
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Here, the choice of R′′ depends heavily on the ratio ω/k2 in addition to an initial
bias towards the largest value state of $96. From the energetic picture we tried
to lay out in previous sections, it is very plausible that this state will have more
motivational momentum because of its high variance, but since this simple attention
model cannot quantify the dependence of the rates on the parameter λ, we cannot
study the behavior due to this terms in detail. The dependence of the rates on the
variance term has not been included in the previous applications, and therefore our
discussion remains incomplete. But in spite of this shortcoming, the method is still
able to shed some light on the interaction of the WM with the various prospects of
the lotteries. The data is shown in Fig. 19.
Birnbaum’s measurements for this pair of gambles was about 69%. For this
particular pair of gambles, the attention is mainly concentrated on gamble R′′ and
little attention is paid to gamble S”. In addition to the bias, the reaction time of the
WM with the lotteries must be less than that of gamble R′′. Therefore, attention is
more concentrated on the chosen item similar to earlier conclusions.
The advantage of including a component representing WM as part of the deci-
sion problem is obvious from these simple illustrations. Even though our discussion
involved only the qualitative influence of the β parameter which is related to the
average anticipated utility, we completely ignored the direct effect of the parameter
λ on the attention process. As we demonstrated in the previous section, this term is
essential to the decision problem and cannot be ignored. However, its effect will be
difficult to quantify theoretically.
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Figure 19 . Lower cumulative independence: R′′ vs S ′′ lotteries. Probability of choos-
ing R as a function of the parameters ω, k1, and  ([9], test 20). The data is for
k1/k2 = 1. –
5 CONCLUSION
Much progress has been made in identifying regions of the brain that are in-
volved in decision making under risk. However, little is known about the actual
mechanisms of choice. Normative theories of decision making have had very limited
success in accounting for many anomalies that appear to be irrational from the view-
point of the laws of probability. But, descriptive theories such as Prospect Theory
were able to address some of these anomalies by introducing a non-linear weighting
function of the probabilities in the utility function. Unfortunately, Prospect Theory
turned out to be itself incomplete. For example, the TAX model of Birnbaum is more
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successful than PT in dealing with violations of coalescence. Though ultimately, a
good theory of decision making will be a theory that is founded on physical principles.
The literature we tried to review in this paper already point to the need to treat infor-
mation and energy in a unified manner to have a consistent picture of entropy that is
valid both at the behavioral and neuronal dynamic levels. In this work, by assuming
that values in a gamble are proportional to some energy scale, we were able to show
that energy and information can be combined in a consistent manner where entropy
is maximized but subject to some constraints. We provided three different angles
from which a decision making problem can be approached using the same principle
of entropy maximization.
In the first approach, we showed how a coarse grained picture of spikes, that
encode probabilities of value (energy) states and its variance, can describe fluctuations
that affect the average value of the gamble and hence influence the decision process.
The decision in this case is driven by the gamble that has the best signal to noise
ratio. Battleground noise in the OFC is significant and affect spike rate of neurons
in this region which is the region where encoding is believed to be carried out.
In the second approach, a more macroscopic picture is adopted. But, instead
of fluctuations in probabilities, a non-linear description of the decision process is
introduced that includes taking account of the variance of the value states. This
allowed us to introduce the entropic utility function, which we argued that it can be
understood as a sum of anticipated gain and information cost associated with the
gain function. Maximization of entropy is introduced here through Jaynes’ principle
of non-extensive entropy, which is necessary to account for various cases.
Finally, the third approach is an attempt to use rate equations to simulate
attention as a way to process the different options of both gambles simultaneously and
to arrive at a decision. This approach is dynamical but we treated only the steady
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state solution which can be interpreted as the choice made by an infinitely large
population. We also showed the importance of including an additional subsystem
that of working memory to represent choice as a competition that may be affected by
the state of mind of the DM. This approach has its own merits since it is capable of
discussing entropy production, a topic that we do not discuss but might be important
in the details of a dynamical theory of decision making. Therefore, this approach
provides a complementary physical picture to the entropic discussion in the second
approach.
In all three approaches, maximization of entropy is respected. While we
expect all three approaches to be complementary and part of a complete decision
theory, there is still the important unanswered question of how a decision is actually
carried out. We know from microscopic dynamics that inhibiting neurons play an
important role in the dynamics of spiking neurons. Therefore, including the physics
of inhibiting neurons is essential for a more physical model of decision making.
Throughout this paper, we tried to treat the dynamics of decision making only in a
qualitative manner and point to the importance of a non-equilibrium (critical) state
for decision making to happen. Decision making, in this picture, is very similar to a
self-organized critical behavior which is another reason why non-extensive entropy is
the proper entropy to use in this problem since it allows us to get observable scaling
laws [52].
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